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[8. F. No. 16724. In 'Bank. Dee. 26, 1944.]

MA YNARD GARRISON, as Insurance Commissioner, ete.,
Appellant, v. EDWARD BROWN AND SONS (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Set-oif-Mutuality-Oapacity of pa.nies.-A fiduciary cannot
set off claims owed him in his personal capacity against obligations that he assumes as a trustee.
.
[2] Insurance -Insolvency - Actions by Liquidator - Oounter·
claims.-In an action by the liquidator of an insurance company against an agent for premiums. collected, the agent, if
a trustee of premiums collected, is entitled to a deduction of
commissions earued as provided in the agency agreement, but
he may not set off claims owing to him in his personal capacity,
as to which he must seek satisfaction from tbe insolvent estate
as a general creditor.
.
[Sa-3c] Oontracts-Actions-Findings-ModiAcation. -In an action against an insurance agent for premiums collected, a finding that subsequent to tbe original agency agreement providing
for a trust relation as to collections, the relationship was modified to that of a debtor and creditor, was not supported by probative facts found where the acts in question were consistent
with the fiduciary duties under the contract.
[4] Trial-Findings-Ultimate and Probative Facts.-An ultimate
finding drawn from probative facts previously found cannot
stand if the probative facts are not susceptible of a construction that will support the judgment.
[5] Oontracts - Modiftcation - Implied Oontract.-Before a contract modifying a written contract can be implied, the conduct
of the parties must be inconsistent with the written agreement
so as to warrant the conclusion that tbey intended to modify
the written contract.
[6] Banks - Deposits - Trusts. - Both as to express trusts and
trusts created by operation of law, an ascertainable interest
in a bank account of the trustee in whicb the funds of the
(1) See 23 Oal.JUT. 262; 47 Am.JUT. 748.
[5) Evidence to establish oral modification of written contract,
note, 94 A.L.R. 1278. See, also, 6 Oal.Jur. 375; 4 Oal.Jur. Ten-7ear
8upp. (1943 Rev.) 164; 12 Am.Jur. 1006.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Set-off and Counterclaim, § 85; [2, 7]
Insurance, § 11; [3] Contracts, § 288; [4] Trial, § 333; [5] Contracts, §l89; [6] Banks, i 89; [8] Agency, 1167; [9] lDsurance,
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trustee and of the beneficiary are deposited constitutes an
asset definite enough to be the subject matter of a trust. The
trust is not invalidated by the fact that the amount to be
remitted by the trustee is a net ba]ance different from the
amount held in trust.
[7a, 7b] Insura.nce - Insolvency - Agent Bolding Premiums. ~
Where an insurance l!Jompany goes into liquidation, its ag-ent
who holds premiums &5 trustee is not under a duty on termina. tion of the contracts in the liquidation proceeding to. return
to the various insureds the excess above the earned premiums,
but rather to remit the funds to the liquidator, as the insureds
are entitled only to participate in the dividend payable out
of the insolvent estate to general creditors.
[8] Agency-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Monq
Received.-An action for money paid to an agent which is
brought on the ground of a subsequent breach by the principal
must be brought against the principal, not the agent. Such
breach does not retroactively affect the lawfulness of the payment and its receipt by the ~ent at the time it was made.
[9] Insurance-AgeDcy-Compensatfon.-Where the insolvency of
an insurance company deprives an agent of commissions on
policies written and not cancelled, he is entitled to compensation equal to the commissions as damages for the breach of
contract.

APPEAL from a judll'JIlent of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge
assigned. Reversed.
Action by liquidator of insurance company against an agent
for premiums collected and not turned over. Judgment
against plaintiff and for defendant on a eross-complaint,
reversed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John L. Nourse, Deputy Attorney General, Hester Webb and U. S. Webb for
Appellant.
Dunne & Dunne, Arthur B. Dunne and Elden C. Friel for
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Union IndeInnity Company, hereinafter
called Union, a Louisiana corporation licensed to do insurance
[8] Liability of &gent for funds received from
82 A.L.R. 307. See, also, 2 Am.Jur. 266.
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business in this state, was declared insolvent by a Louisiana
court on January 6, 1933, and was declared insolvent in California b:v decree of the Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco on January 12, 1933. The Insurance Commissioner was appointed liquidator in California and vested
wHh all property rights of the company in California. It
does not appear that Union WaR unable to meet its liabilities
as they became due or that it ceased operations before it was
declared insolvent, although for some time before that date, at
least since October 1, 1932, the liabilities of the company
exceeded its assets. Union's liquidation in Louisiana resulted
in a dividend of less than 4 per cent. In California no dividend has yet been paid. This case arises out of Union's
relation to its general agent for California. Edward Brown
& Sons, hereinafter called Brown. On October 1, 1931, Brown
entered into a written agreement, guaranteed by the two
other defendants, to act as general agent for Union. This
agreement was modified and supplemented by another written agreement. also effective since October 1, 1931. There
was also a profit-sharing agreement. Following the appoint.
ment of the liquidator in this state, defendants filed with
him a claim for $9].74~.52. of which he allowed $25,897.97,
rejecting the balance In ,January, 1936, defendants filed a
petition for an ordE'r to show cause why their claim should not
be allowed for the full amount. In the same month the plaintiff liquidator filed this action against the defendants to recover $11.702.29 later modified to $9,7!'i7.39. allegedly representing insurance premiums co]]ected by Brown before and
after the declaration of insolvencv and not turned over to
Union or the Iiquidlltor. Under th~ agreements of October 1,
1931, Brown was appointed Union's agent for the purpose
of "procuring acceptable applications for, and collecting
premiums" on the ~Iasses of insurance and bonds named
in the agreements. Brown was required to adhere to the
rates prescribed by Union and to comply with the rules and
regulations of the company with respect to the issuance
of policies lind bonds and "to conduct the business • • •
strictly upon such terms, conditions and instructions as the
Company may prescribe in its letters of instruction, or by
letter, telegram, or telephone." Brown was to report to
Union daily, or as soon as practicable, each policy or other
writiDg issued and each change in the character or amount of
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Uuion's liability. Brown had also to render to Union monthly
accounts cO\·ering all poliries written, renewed or cancelled
duriEg the preceuin;:; month and to remit the amount thereof
by deposit in a cert:!ill San }<'l'ancisco banI, on the fourth day
of the fourth month following that in which the business was
written. The agent was respollsibJp under the agreement for
the payment of all original ann advance premiums on bonds ,
and policies written by it. In the case of cancellatiolls it was
allowed return premiums if no premiums had been collected.
The agency agreement further provided: "All premiums collected by the agent for the company are the property of the
company and shall be held by the agent as a fiduciary trust
until deliverey to the company. The privilege of deducting
commissions which are debts due the agent, if granted, shall
not be taken as a waiver by the company of its exclusive
ownership of all premiums." As to termination of the agency,
the agreement called for a sixty-day written notice by either !
party and empowered Union to terminate the relation instantly for cause. Brown's last remittance to Union covered
business written until the end of September, 1932. Plaintiff's
action relates to premiums on business written after that date
and, to a small extent, to premiums on previous business
collected upon an audit. Defendants filed an answer denying
any liability and setting up their claims against Union as an
off-set and counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment
against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on their crosscomplaint for $39,267.31, which was reduced to $24,267.31
when a motion for a new trial was argued. Plaintiff appealed,
and defendant filed a cross-appeal, which was not perfected.
The matter is here on the clerk's transcript, the reporter having died while proceedings to secure a reporter's transcript
were pending (Caminetti v. Edward Brown & Sons, 23 Cal.
2d 511 [144 P.2d 570].) The sole question to be determined
is whether the findings of the trial court support the
judgment.
Defendants contend that the agency agreement under which
Brown was a trustee of the premiums collected was so modi- fied as to make the relation of Union and Brown one of creditor
and debtor rather than of beneficiary and trustee, and that
this modification has been conclusively determined by the
trial court in its findings. [1] If defandanta undertook
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their obligations as to the remittance of premiums in a fiduciary capacity, they would not be permitted to set off. personal claims: for a fiduciary cannot set off claims owed t.o him
in his personnl cnpacity against obligations that he assumes as
a trustee. (Bond v. City of Pasadena, 6 Ca1.2d. I3!J, 141
[56 P.2d 946); [(aye v. Metz. 186 Cal. 42, 49 [198 P. 1047] ;
In re lIildcbrandt, 92 Cal. 433, 436 [28 P. 486] ; Flynn v.
Seale, 2 Cal.App. 665, 670[84 P. 263]; Libby v. II ollkins,
104 U.S. 303 [26 L.Ed. 769); Cook County Nat. Bank v.
United States, 107 U.S. 445, 452 [2 S.Ct. 561, 27 L.Ed. 537) ;
Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S. 502 [25 S.Ct.
339,49 L.Ed. 571) ; Alvord v. Ryan, 212 F. 83, 85 [128 C ..C.A.
539] ; Sperb v. McCoun, 110 N.Y. 605 [18 N.E. 441, 1 L.R.A.
490] j Topas. v. Jokn MacGregor Grant, Inc., 18 F.2d 724,
52 A.L.R. 807; see Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees;
§ 812, p. 2354; 47 Am .•Jur., Setoff and Counterclaim, § 51.)
[2] If defendants were trustees of the premiums collected,
they would therefore be obligated to remit them, deducting
only commissions earned thereon as provided in the agency
agreement. With respect to all claims not allowed as deductions from the premiums to be remitted, they would have to
seek satisfaction from Union's insolvent estate as general
creditors. [3a] It must therefore be determined whether
defendants' contention that their trusteeship established in
the agency agreement was abolished, is sustained by the following finding: "At all times after October 1, 1931, to the
knowledge of said Union Indemnity Company, and with its
consent, all collections made by Edward Brown & Sons on
account of premiums or otherwise, as agent of Union Indemnity Company or for Union Indemnity Company were deposited by Edward Brown & Sons in its own bank account or
bank accounts unsegregated from other funds • • • and all
settlements between Edward Brown & Sons and Union Indemnity Company were made on a net cash basis. In respect to all
moneys due -to Union Indemnity Company from Edward
Brown and Sons the relation . • • was that of debtor and
creditor and with the knowledge and consent of Union Indemnity Company, Edward Brown & Sons never collected or held
any moneys paid as or for premiums on any policy of Union
Indemnity Company as a trust fund; and, in this respect the
contract of the parties was modified and said modification was
fully performed ••• Prior to January 6, 1933, it was agreed

...
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between Edward Brown & Sons and Union Indemnity Company that the relationship between Union Indemnity Company on account of premiums on its policies and bonds collected by and paid to Edward Brown & Sons should be that
only of a debtor and creditor and that Edward Brown & Sons
should not be required to keep any moneys paid to it on
account of premiums segregated or as trust funds or as fidueiary funds and that the only obligation or duty of Edward
Brown & Sons in respect to any money so received should be a
personal obligation to pay monthly to Union Indemnity Company the balance, if any, due after allowing credit to Edward
Brown & Sons for funds expended by it on behalf of Union
Indemnity Company, including return premiums paid on
account of cancellationS, and, on January 6, 1933, said agreement was fully performed.~'
This finding includes the finding of certain probative facts
and the conclusion that these facts are sufficient under the
law to create a contract. (See Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U.S. 665 [64 S.Ct. 1240, 1243, 88 L.Ed 1525]; Holmes,
The Common Law, 115; Green, Mixed Q1UStions of Law and
Fact, 15 Harv.L.Rev. 271, 272; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner:
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 753,822.)
[4] "It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate
finding . . • which is drawn as a conclusion from facts previously found, cannot stand if· the specific facts upon which
it is based do not support it" (McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal.
243, 246 [124 P. 1016, Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S.
303J) that if, if the probative facts are not susceptible of a
eonstruction that will support the judgment. (Quinn v.
Rosenfeld, 15 Cal.2d 486, 491 [102 P.2d 317) ; Matter of Forrester, 162 Cal. 493, 495 [123 P. 283] ; People v. McCue, 150
Cal: 195,198 [88 P. 899J; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. Barth Invest.
Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 609 [262 P. 31]; Loud v. Lwe, 214 Cal.
10, 12 [3 P.2d 542]; Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 Ca1.2d
722, 727 [112 P.2d 3].)
[Sb] Nowhere in its findings has the trial court included
probative facts that would indicate that Union and Brown ...
ever modified the agency agreement by an express contract
substituting a creditor and debtor relationship for the fidueiary relationship contemplated by the agency agreement.
There is no reference to any writing or to any circumstances
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under which any other express contract might have been made
between the parties. The probative facts that are statrd in
the finding, namely, that with the knowledge and COllsent of
Union, Brown deposited all money collected on behalf of
Union ill its own bank account or bank accounts unsegrcgatrd
from other funds, and that all settlements betwerll BrO\\"ll
and Union were made on a net cash basi!';, relate to the cOlldnrt
of Brown in performing the contract. When the finding is
read as a whole and in connection with defendant's answer to
the complaint· (Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Ca1.2d 1, 15 [82 P.2d
375] ; Kohner v. National Surety Co., 105 Cal.App. 430, 440
[287 P. 510]; Dam v. Zink, 112 Cal. 91, 93 [44 P. 331]), it
is clear that the agreement therein referred to was an implied
contract. It must therefore be determined whether the probative facts are susceptible of a construction that will support
the finding of an implied contract. [6] Before a contract
modifying a written contract can be implied, the conduct of
the parties according to the findings of the trial court must be
inconsistent with the written contract so as to warrant the
conclusion that the parties intended to modify the written
contract. (Columbia Oasualty Co. v. Lewis, 14 Cal.App.2d
64,72 [57 P.2d 1010] ; Harbor Const. 00. v. Walters, 101 Cal.
App. 470, 478 [281 P. 1062].) [30] The fact that the settlements between Brown and Union were made on a net cash
basis does not warrant the conclusion that the parties intended
to modify the agency agreement, for the settlements were in
accord with the provisions of that agreement that remittance
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·Paragraph VII of defendants' answer alleged : "At all times men·
tioned in the complaint and herein during which EDW.A.RD BROWN &
SONS acted as agent in respect to Union Indemnity Company under
the, agreement Exhibit 'A' (Original Agency Agreement) to the com·
plaint, it acted as such and under said agreement only as the same is
modified by Exhibit <A' hereto and as modified (among other respects)
as next hereinafter stated, that is to say:
"At all times after October 1, 1931, to the knowledge. of Union In·
demnity Company and with its consent all collections on account of premiums made by EDW.A.RD BROWN & SONS were deposited by EDW.A.RD BROWN & SONS in its own account or accounts and the same
were not kept segregated, and all settlements between EDWARD BROWN
& SONS and Union Indemnity Company were made on a net cash basis,
and at all of said times in respect of all moneys due to Union Indemnity Company by agreement of EDW.A.RD BROWN & SONS and Union
Indemnity Company the relationship between EDW.A.RD BROWN &
SONS and Union Indemnity Company as to any moneys due to Union
Indemnity Company from EDWARD BROWN & SONS was that of
c1ebtor and creditor. The relationship aDd modification as aforesaid ....
aDd baa bee fully performed."
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by the agent was to be made on the basis of business written
after credit for concellations with "the privilege> or de>r1ucting commissions which are debts due the agC'nt" which "if
granted, shall not be taken as a waiver by the company of its
exclusive ownership of all premiums." The> depositing b~'
Brown with Union's knowledge and consent of all collected
premiums in Brown's own bank account llmro;.:rC'gated from
Brown's ovm funds was also consistent with Drown's fiduciary
duties under the agency. agreement. [6] It is settled as to
both express trusts. and trusts creat<'(1 h~' operation of law
that an ascertainable interest in a ballk aec-ount of the trustee
in which funds of the trustee and of the beneficiary are deposited constitutes an asset definite enough to be the subject
matter of a trust. (Co1"ley v. Hennessy, 58 Cal.App.2d 883,
885 [137 P.2d 857] : Kobida v. Hinkclmann. 53 Cal.App.2d
186, 193 [127 P.2d 657] ; Mitchell v. Dunn, 211 Cal. 12!), 136
[294 P. 386] ; Koble v. ;\'oble, 198 Cal. 120. 134 [243 P. 439,
43 A.L.R. 1235] ; Estate of Arms, 186 Ca1. 554, 562 [199 P.
1053]; Elizalde v. Elizalde, 137 Cal. 634, 635, 641 [66 P. 36!),
70 P. 861].) The fact that the amount to be remitted by defendants was a net balance different from the amount held in
trust did not invalidate the trust, for funds may be held in
trust to secure payment of an amount different from the total
of the trust funds. The written agency agreement must therefore be regarded as controlling, for written contracts cannot
be set aside and implied agreements substituted therefor if
the conduct of the parties was not clearly contrary to the
terms of the written contract. (Columbia Casualty Co. v.
Lewis, 14 Cal.App.2d 64, 72 [57 P.2d 1010]; Houghton v.
Lawton, 63 Ca1.App. 218, 223 [218 P. 475) ; see 4 Cal.Jur.
Ten-year Supp. (1943 Rev.) 164; 94 A.L.R. 1278.) Since
the probative facts on which the ultimate finding is based is
not susceptible of the construction that there was an implied
agreement modifying the written contract, they do not support the trial court's finding that there was an implied agreement.
[7a] Defendants also contend that plaintiff's claim is de- ..
feated by the following finding: "It is true that prior to
January 6, 1933 defendant Edward Brown & Sons received
moneys ••• as and for premiums • • . written in the months
of October through December 1932, inclusive. It is not true
that after deducing therefrom all return premiUJll8 on ....
...:J._
I ·
y.....-
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/

des and/or bonds cancelled prior to January 6, 1933, and
all commissions earned thereon, defandant Edward Brown
held or still holds any sum belonging to Union Indemnity
Company or owned by plaintiff herein or owed or owes Union
Indemnity Company or plaintiff herein any sum or that said
defendant, after January 6, 1933, or now, holds or held any
money or thing belonging to Union Indemnity Company or
plaintiff or owes any sum to Union Indemnity Company or
plaintiff. After January 12, 1933, defendant Edward Brown
& Sons received money which was the equivalent of a portion
of premiums on policies and bonds in effect on January 6,
1933. It is not true that after deducting therefrom all commissions earned, Edward Brown & Sons holds any sum which
was the property of Union Indemnity Company or any BUm
which is now vested in or owned by plaintiff or owed or owes
Union Indemnity Company or plaintiff any sum •.. Any and
all sums collected by Edward Brown & Sons for or on behalf
of Union Indemnity Company and any and all sums at any
time due from Edward Brown & Sons to Union Indemnity
were paid by Edward Brown & Sons to Union Indemnity
Company.... "
Even if it is assumed that this is a finding of fact rather
than a conclusion of law, it must be read in conjunction with
finding XVII, defining unearned premiums and excluding
such premiums from Union's claims against Brown, and it is
then clearly apparent that the court found that Union was
entitled only to the "earned portion" of the premiums, namely
that portion covering the period ending January 6, 1933. The
hasis of this finding is that Union had no right to remittance
by the agent of any portion of the premiums paid by the insured to Brown allocable to the time after Union ceased to do
business. In passing upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
the trial court stated that the case was decided on the theory
that when Union went into liquidation in Louisiana the funds
in the hands of Brown "were frozen, and that it was his duty
upon th(' termination of the contracts in the liquidation proceedings to return the money to the various insureds. over
and above the amount of the earned premiums." This theory
is erroneous. It is not supported by section 2344 of the Civil
Code providing: "If an agent receives anything for the benefit of his principal, to the possession of which another person
is entitlrd. h(' must, on demand, surrender it to BUch person, or

as
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so much of it as he has under his control at the time of demand,
on being indemnified for any advance which he h~s made
to his principal, in good faith, on account of the Sllme; and is
responsible therefor, if, after notice from the towner, he delivers it to his principal." This rule entitles one who has paid
money through fraud or mistake to an innocent agent to recover from him, unless the agent has turned oye;' the money
to his principal or otherwise changed Ms position. (Weiner
Y. Roof, 19 Ca1.2d 748, 752 [122 P.2d 896).) In the present
ease, however, the insured sought to re('over back premiums
on the ground not of fraud or mistake. but of the breach of
contract that Union committed when it allowed itself to be
declared insolvent. (Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
23 Ca1.2d 94, 102 [142 P.2d 74] 1: see Federico M. Mfg. Co.
v. Great Western F.Ins. Co .. 173 La. 90!,) P3D SO. ],79 A.L.R.
1256].) There was no breach until Union was declared insolvent. Until that time Pnion functioned as an insurance company, covering losses of its insureds. Only upon the entry of
the order directing its liquidation did Union's liabilities toward its creditors and claims against its debtors become fixed.
(2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931. Act. 3739, § 4.) [8] A suit to
recover money paid to an agent upon the ground that the contract was subsequently breached by the principal must be
brought against the principal and not against the agent. The
alleged breach of contract does not retroactively affect the
lawfulness of the payment and its receipt by the agent at the
time when it was made. (Blea11 v. Wright, 110 Mich. 183
[68 N.W. 115]; Pinnegan v. Geoghegan, 111 N.Y.S. 656;
Tripple v. Littlefield, 46 Wash. 156 [89 P. 493] ; Cooper v.
Tim, 16 Misc. 372 r38 KY.S. 67J: Hnffman v.Newman, 55
Neb. 713 [76 N.W. 409: ll'right v. Merritt Realty Co., 148
Wash. 380 [268 P. 873] : Bank of United States v. Bank of
Washington, 6 Pet. (3] U.S.)8, 17 [8 L.Ed. 2991 ; see 3 C.J.S.
128; 2 Am.Jur., Agency, ~ 340; 23 L.R.A.N.S. 558; 1 Mechem
on Agency, (2d ed.), § 1482. p. 1102; 82 A.L.R. 307; ct. Pancoast v. Dinsmore, 105 Me. 471 r75 A. 43, 134 Am.St.Rep......
582]; Cassimus v. Vaughn Realty Co .. 217 Ala. 561 f117 So.
180J; Smith v. Binder, 75 Ill. 492.) [7b] Moreover, a claim
under section 2344 against the agent is limited to what the
claimant is entitled to demand from the principal. Since
Union became insoh'ent, the insureds were entitled to par~te onq·m the dividend payable out of the insolv8Ilt
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estate to general creditors. This court Mllld, not recognize
a ehdm for full sntiRraction b~l the agent to whom the premium
was paid without creating a preferential right for those insureds who happened to pny their premiums to an agent at
the expensC' of all otl1(:'T creditorR, includin~ tIle other insureds.
The creation of su('h 1\ prcfl'rential right would go beyond the purpose of section 2344. which is to avoid cir.
cuity of action rather t.han to enlarge the scope of the recovery
to which the claimant is entitled against the principal. After
the appointment of a liquidator, who may take possession of
all assets of the insolvent insurance company, it was the duty
of the agent to remit funds in his hands to the liquidator for
the purposes of liquidation.
[9] The question remains whether defendants' claim for
compensation for servicers rendered from October 1, 1932, to
January 12, 1933, which forms one of the items of the com·
putation in question, should be upheld. The trial court found
that the reasonable value of such services, which were not
compensated, was in excess of $20,000. The services include
Brown's activities relative to the writing of policies before
Union was declared insolvent, for which Brown did not obtain
the commissions due because Union's insolvency intervened.
Other uncompensted services relate to policies cancelled by
the insureds before Union was declared insolvent, cancella.
tions which defendants claim occurred. not in the ordinary
course of business. but because Union's financial status was
already disrupted. The question whether compensation is
owed for these services is a question of law. Insolvency of
an insurance company is as much a creach of contract with
the agents as with thE' insureds. (See Caminetti v. Pacific
M1dual Lile In.~. Co .. supra.) In so far as Brown was deprived by Union's insolvency of commissions for policies written and not cancened. Brown is entitled to compensation equal
to the commissions afo; damages for the breach of contract committed by Union. Reco/!Tlition of this claim does not include
the recognition of any claim of the agent ba.c;ed on the loss of
business for the time after Union's insolvency. No such claim
is submitted on this appeal. There was. hmvever, no breach
of contract on the part of Union 8S to policie!'! and bonds
alread~' cancelled when Union was declared insolvent. Brown
assumed the risk under the agenc~' agreement of losing compensation because of cancellations.

)
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Plaintifi' has attacked as unintelligIole the finding containing the computation of the claims of the parties. Since we do
not approve the theories of the trial court underlying this
computation, it would serve no useful purpose to inquire into
the inteJJigibility of the finding, for it wm not stand in the
way of the trial court upon the retrial of the ease.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., eonenned.

)

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. This is a judgment roll appeal.
We do not know what evidence was before the trial court. As
shown in the findings of fact (quoted more fully in the majority opinion) the trial court found, among other things, that
"Prior to January 6, 1933. it was agreed between Edward
Brown & Sons and Union Indemnity Company that the relationship between Union Indemnity Company on account of
premiums on its policies and bonds collected by and paid to
Edward Brown & Sons should be that only of a debtor and
creditor and that ... the only obligation or duty of Edward
Brown & Sons in respect of any money so received should be
a personal obligation to pay monthly to Union Indemnity
Company the balance. if any. due after anowing credit to
Edward Brown & Sons for funds expended by it on behalf
of Union Indemnity Comnany. including return premiums
paid on account of cancellations. and, on January 6. 1933
said agreement was fu1J~' performed."
The above quoted finding. standing alone, fully supports
the judgment in so far as concerns that phase of the ease upon
which the majority opinion bases the reversal. To escape or
overcome the effect of this finding of ultimate facts the majority opinion relies UDon the proposition that (a) certain probative facts were found which. it holds do not necessarily
establish such ultimate facts and that (b) the findings do not
set forth other nrobative fact." which would establish such
ultimate facts. From that proposition the inference is drawn,
or presumption indul/!ed. in favor of reversing the .1udgment,
that no evidence was produced suffic:>ient to support the finding
of ultimate facts. I do not find such inference or presumption tenable upon the record before us.
It has been sound and long-established law, which 1 deplore
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!>eeing disturbed, that "In reviewing the sufficiency of the
finding!' to support "the judgment, regard will bc had to the
ultimate facts found, and not to mere probative facts, which
are not shown by the findings to be the only facts proved, and
from which alone the court finds the ultimate facts. In the
absence of such showing, the mere circumstance that some of
the prohative fact" are inconsistent with the ultimate facts
will not prevent the ultimate fact!> from controlling" (2 Cal.
JUT. 872-873. ~ 511) and "an appellate court in reviewing the
findings will give them a liberal construction in support of
the judgment." (ld., p. 871.)
Here; the probative findings on which the majority relies
to overcome the finding of ultimate facts are inadequate to
that end. They may be insufficient in themselves to establish the ultimate fa~ts but they are not inconsistent with them
and do not preclude the existence of evidence which would
support the finding of nlHmate facts. "Any uncertaintieR
in the findings ar(' to receive such construction as will uphold
rather than defeat the judgment" (2 Cal.JUT. 871. ~ 511)
and upon a hldgnlPnt roll appeal it will be presumed that
competent evidence sufficient to sustain the findings was received without objection and "that there was no evidence
before the conrt which in any l'espeC't rille lified or limited the
effect of th(' findin!!'S" (2 Ca1..Tur. 877-878. & 514.) See. also,
Carpenter v. Pr()loff (1!l3!lL ::l0 Cal.App.2d 400. 407 r86 P.2d
fWJl : ~Wes v. Rodkin (H141 L 43 CAl.App.2d 839. 840 fln
p.2o 6751: Lamanct v. Lamanet (1937)' 18 Cal.App.2d 402,
40S r63 P.2il J19!'il : Whifnc1/ v. Redfern (1940),41 Cal.App.
2il 409. 413 nOll P.2il 9191.
In the last cit('il ('flse it was held that "Upon an appeal on
the judgment roll alone. only the ultimate fact" found by the
court. not the probative facts which have no proper place in
the findings. can be considered. and it is only in those cases
where it clearly appears that the ultimate fact found is based
upon and edduced from the findings of probative facts. and
it is plain that the latter do not justify nor support the ultimate fact found. that the findings of probative facts will con-....
thor that of the ultimate fact. and so deprive the judgment of
support "
In Perry v. Quackenbush (1894) 105 Cal. 299, 305 P.
7401, this court held that "Findings of probative facts will
not, in general, control, limit, or modi4 the findings of the
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u It.imate fact. The province of the trial court is to find the
ultimate facts, not prohative facts. If, from a consideratioll of the probative facts, this court should determine that
th~y aid not justify tIle finding of the ultimate fact it would
determine that the evidclJc{' was insnfficient to justify the
decision. This, it lias been repeatedly held, cannot be done
in this mode." (See, also. Breeze v. Tnternational Banking
Curl). (1914), 25 Cal.App. 437, 443 [143 P. 10G6] ; Pio Pico
v. Cuyas (1873),47 Cal. 174, 178.)
The finding of ultimate facts in the record here appears
to fully support the judgment. Since the findings do not
preclude the existence of evidence to support the ultimate
facts and do not establish probative facts which are essentially inconsistent with the ultimate facts found it seems to
me that consideration for sound administration of justice demands that we affirm the judgment.
Edmonds, J., concurred.

)

Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January
22,1945. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., alia Spellce, J., voted for
a rehearing.

...
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